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ABSTRACT:
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success of microfnance in t'it'iiio"' i"*| 'i' 
miff-nlinanie industry maintaincd i
irs stabilitlt during thc A'i'';";;;;;;i'i crisis' l"inaliv' 
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Keberhasilan Bank Grameen dalam 
meningkalkan 'kondisi 
ekonomi masyarakat
miskin di Bangladesh ^"'d"'';";;;;;;;;ircdit 
ntikro mcniadi pusat perhatiun'
Berdasarlran kondisi rersebut"^?^Li,ti""i 
lndoncsia unt.uk melal"akan program
vdns sama dalam meningka'in''i"oion"'oan 
dan pengentasan kemiskinan di
'ncs;ra ini. Bank RalEat t"il''"'i'-i"i"goi salah s.attt 'Bank 
di lndonesia vang
su-kscs membantu t*'o'o*'i''ni'ii ^7'7ng*ttron 
kcsejahreraan mercka Papcr
ini membahas '"n'o', 
u"ulln[oii"''''if ii i"i''t1si1"^!imutai dengan seiarah
singkat dari keuangan mikro'i-llndonesia' 
Kenuulian menyoroti satlt keberhasilan
penting dari keuangan mikro df Indonesia .mengenai bagaimana 
indutri
'keuangan miloo dapat ^"^'i""i"i'i'' 
srabilitas \e'lama krisis keuangan di
Asia. Akhirnya, secara kritis.rieino, i"ar,l"po 
ma.sulah ;'anz dihudapi keuangan




';;r;;";;i*"na Indonesia bisa engatasi isu vang beredar'
Ksta kunci: keuangan mikro' ekononti 
keberlaniuta't'
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INTRODUCTION
Microcredit involves the loaning
of small amounts (typically USD l0)
of money to the Poor. It is
characterized by group lending'
rigorous monitoring and progressive
lendings to lower the risks of default'
and to lower the costs of monitoring
and administration.
Group lending lowers the risks
of default for two reasons: the Peer
selection process by group members
ensure that trustworthy and
creditworthy individuals are admitted
into the group. After all, the grouP
mernbers know their fellow villagers
best, and would not want a "bad
apple" to jeopardize their chances of
obtaining loans.
Loan repayments are also due
fairly quickly and frequently (e.g'
every week or once every two weeks).
This kind of meticulous monitoring
enablcs the lender to establish the
creditworthiness of their clients very
quickly.
Progressive lending means that
borrowers are glven increased
borrowing limits after they establish a
good credit record of Prompt
repayments. Hence, Progressive
lending pmvides an incentive for
borrowers to repay their loans on time,
so that they would be eligiblc for
increased loan amounts,
Microfrnance is a wider
definition as compared to microcredit.
In addition to microcredit,
microfinance also includes other
value-adding activities like the
provision of business and financial
advice, and also the Provision of
savings and insurance services- The
inclusion of savings is important. as it
allows the microfinance institutions to
recycle the savings from the
community into loans, theretY
creating a more sustainable form of
banking.
Indonesia is one of the
developing countries that zuccessfully
run sustainable microfinance in a
relatively large scale. For example'
Bank Rakyat lndonesia (BRI) unit
network is now the largest and one of
the most profitable rural micro
banking networks in the developing
world. Therefore, this makes
microfinance in Indonesia an
253
interesting research subject from
which we hope to leam some best
practices in this area.
OVERVIEW OF'
MICROFINANCE IN INDONESIA
Microcredit is defined by Bank
Indonesi4 the central bank, as a loan
below Rp0.50 million (US$5,373), a
financial product provided by formal
and serni-formal financial providers in
Indonesia.
As of 2003, 31.2 million poor
people were living in Indonesi4 and
represented l7.4Vo of the population.
Approximately 20o/o of Indonesia's
214 million people depend on micro-
and small-scale businesses to eam a
living, but only l0 million out of 42
million microenterprises have access
to credil from formal financial
institutions.
After the financial crisis of
1997 -98, poverty alleviation became
one of the first priorities of &e
govemment engaged in wide.range
financial reforms, which also sought to
reduce growing income disparities
between people, and between regions.
Seveml studies have demonstrated that
there is still an unmet dernand for
microfinance services. as a majority of
rural households still do not have
access to a source of funds from a
serni-formal or formal institution. The
regulated microfinance providers, BRI
Units and BPRs, tends to cover mostly
the upper levels ofthe microenterprise
martet, in district and sub-district
towns, with loans of more than Rp 3
million (US$320), while NGOs,
cooperatives, and village-based
institutions village-bascd institutions -
Badan Kredit Desa (BKDs). Badan
Kredit Kecamatan (BKKs) - reach a
lower end of the market but still have
a limited outreach in rural areas.
HISTORY OF IIIICROFINANCE
IN INDONESIA
lndonesia has a long history of
commercial microfinance, starting a
century ago with the Badan Kredit
Desa (BKD or Village Credit
Organisation), Bank Krcdit
Kecamatan (BKK's) village-owed
banks offering microcredit on
I
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commercial terms. Approximately
7,000 BKDs operate in Indonesia
nowadays. Sustainable microfinance
in the banking sector began in 1970
with the opening of Bank Dagang Bali
(BDB), a private bank in Bali
specialised in commercial
microfinance, which built it success
on the knowledge of microfinance
clients and on state-of-the art savings
products. BDB was closed by Bank
Indonesia in 2004 due to govemance
and liquidity problems.
The gencric term for small
financial institutions in Indonesia is
Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (people,s
Credit Bank, or BpR), which were
inuoduced by Bank Indonesia in I97g.
eft& the 1988 financial reforms of
PAKTO 88, new secondary banks
were established, also called BpRs.
Spercific requirements for the licensing
of pre-existing BpRs (capital, size of
deposits) were set but never fu y
respected. Today, BpRs includes
Iiccnsed financial institutions, mostly
privately-owned, that meet the criteria
specified in the I 992 Banking law,
and number 2,148 in 2004 (accounring
for l5o/o of the microfinance market),
and almost 9,000 public rural financial
institutions that are not licensed, and
can be categorized as generic BpRs,
which include village-owned BKDs of
Java and Madura, and the Lernbaga
Dana dan Kredit pedesaan (LDKps) or
Rural Fund and Credit Institution,
owned mostly by provincial
govemments (or in some cases by
villages).
In 1984, in the wake of new
financial reforms undertaken by the
govemment, Bank Rakyat Indonesia
transformed its sub-branches (.Unit
Desa') network operating at
suMishict level. The outlets were
transformed from loss_making
channelling agent for the govemment
subsidised credit program lor rice
cultivatjon (BIMAS) into commercial
microfinance intermediaries. The unit
network is now the lagest and one of
the most profitable rural microbanking
networks in the developing world.
During the 1997-9g financial
crisis, most of BRI microfinance
clients kept their kust in the financial
seniccs offcred by BRI units; clients
maintained and even increased their
savings levels. The BRI Unit Desas
25s
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The serni-formal financial sector
has had a much smaller role in the
provision of microfinance in
Indonesia. Traditionally in Indonesia
NCOs have not play a sigrrificant role
in financial intermediation, but
focused on social mobilisation, at
times pa(nering with govemment
poverty reduction programs. ln r€rent
years, a few NCOs have ventured into
commercial microfinance, with the
establishment of their own BPRs, or in
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two specific calses: a commercial bank
in Central Java and a cooperative in
Lombok. During the Suharto regime,
the cooperative system was highly
politicised and used as vehicle to
disburce cheap credit to targeted
groups. The cooperative sector still
suffers from political interference and
also from weak"regulations.
In addition, government
programs have provided subsidised
credit financing to targeted
populations, using the commercial
banking system to channel the funds.
To assist poor farmers, the Income
Generating Program for Small
Farmers and Fishermen (Pembinaan
Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani-
Nelayan Kecil, or P4K), provides sot
loans through self-help groups. To
reach women, the Prosperous Family
Program implernented by the National
Family Planning Coordinating Board
(Badan Koordinasi Keluarga
Berencana Nasional, or BKKBN) has
a network of village outlets and
operates through women's groups, by
encouraging savings mobilisation and
disbursing subsidised credit.
unaffected success during the crisis
were in sharp contrast with BRI heavy
losses on its corporate portfolio, which
meant that BRI became technically
bankrupt, and had to be rescued by a
public restructuring and refinancing
program, as for the rest of the banking
industry-
Another significant player in the
formal microfinance mar{<et is the
statc-owned pawning company, Perum
Pegadaian, serving million of low-
income people. With these three main
players (BRI, BPRs, and Pegadaian),
the formal financial sector is the
dominant force in microfinance, and
outperforms the semiformal and
informal sectors by a large margin.
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Finally, lndonesia has also a
iong history of informal credit and
savings schemes, comprising Rotating
Salings and Credit Associations
{RoSCAs) or Arisan in Indonesian,
and other forms of haditional finance.
However, most of these schemes have
limited outreach and sustainability
Thc fact that BRI, villagd units
tregan operating profitably was a
major achievement
reorganization. The
aansformation was largely completed
rvithin only four years (1984-1987),
and the cost to the Govemment in
terms of subsidies was relatively low.
By 1985, most of the units were
a profit. In 1991 the unit
accounted for 25 percent of
BRI's deposits, l0 percent of
+rtstanding loans and over 70 pcrcent
:i its profits (Robinson. 1992,1.
The factors contributing to this
--d\jcess werc the *'idc mobilization of
savings rvith government guarantees,
increased staff productivity (the result
ol motivation and training). and the
which the village unit network
received fiom BRI's entire struchre
of the
network's
(whereby CaDang provided technical
lbllow-up and monitoring services and
ensured a balance between profitable
and unprofitable units). In December
1996, the village units had 16.2
million depositors, 2.5 million
borrowers, and a surplus of
$1,260,000 in $avings over
outstanding loans ($1,705,000). BRI's
outr€ach places it among the world's
largest institutions offering services
to rural aeas A comparison of unit
performance of BRI and KUD - two
networks which were crcated to
support the green revolution
suggests that the Government has
established two very different cntities.
One is a commercial enterprise liee of
cumbersome- operations and
constraints which might undermine its
efficiency (although it is still
wlnerable to the pressures of
comrption) and possessing the
financial and human resources
enabling it to operate profitably. The
other is a policy-oriented channel for
govemment support for specific
agricultural development programs
and a player in defining the structure
of rural areas. Older institutions thus
were affected differently by the
257
liberalization process. The study will
now examine its imPact on new






characteristics contribute to the
ability of a network or an
association of small banks or
Microfinance Institutions to
contribute to the develoPment of
its respective sector: an efficient
management, a transParent
governance structure, increasing
sustainability, a big and
committed membershiP, a
demand for seryices and the





helps to divide labor and
coordinate tasks. Sound financial
management is a precondition for
efficient work and building of
trust. A business Plan is a
powerful management instrument:
it outlines the vision and
development goals for the next
years. It should be revised
according to the objectives and
reacts to external signals,
opportunities and threats. Vision
and objectives should serve
members' interests. As Br[ntruP
points out, business Plans give the
association a common direction
and can be used to plan for self
sufliciency, "by rnaking the
distinction between vital keY
activities, services, and resources
necessary for the survival of the
MFA, and suPPlementary
elements that are important but
not indispensable."
The governance slructure ls
closely related to the management
capacity. An elficient governance
structurc demands transpatency,
impartiality and a strong
executive. It should be liee of
political interference. Due to the
voluntary mernbershiP, an
unequal distribution of resources
258
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Sustainability
Whether or not MFAs
should be financially sustainable
depends largely on the t-vpe of
services they offer. Lobbfing,
information exchange,
coordination of. sector-wide
activities are services that cannot
be provided in a cost covering
1\,ay, as the industry as a whote
benefits from thern it would be
difficult to identifi individual
entities that could be charged for
the services. Other services, such
as training have to be sold at
market prices.
Thus, MFAs should be
considered sustainable when core
serr"ices are provided based on
membership fees. It is cnrcial to
distinguish between an
msociation, which offers goods
that benefit the whole sector and
are hard to value or sell at a fixed
price to customers, and training
providers, offering specific
courses for a specific price. For
the lattcr, the sustainability should
be increasing. Growing cost
coverage in income statements
gives a realistic perspective on the
institution's future sustainability.
The role of donors can be crucial:
the maintenance of the logic of an
artificial economy introduced by
donor funds has to be avoided by
all means. Incentives for the MFA
to become sustainable and a
gradual exit strategy need to be
developed. Furthermore, MFAs,
like all member-based
institutions, should not. be
dominated by donors and have
enough space to develop from
within.
4. Membership
A big membership and the
ownenhip and commitment of
members are helpful to build up a
client base and ensure
mcmbership fees. A big
membership increases political
power and influence in the
t)v
by the association can lead to
abandonment by the mernbers,
unless their commitment and ties
are very strong. Thus,
commitment and representation of
mernbers should be insured.
lfu Strcussfut oJ f+tfcrof;narce fm!fie Sus*inabitity of lalondanTmwnirs' aryan 9e\miniI
microfinance industry. On the




membership base, the more
intemal problems arise. More
common goals and a better
political standing are achieved
with a homogenous membership
base. Horvever, maximising the
membership in order to broaden
the financial basis is not the right
strategy. Membership fees are
low and do not justifo lowering
the entrance criteria if the result is
a weaker association. The quality
of the membership, a common
commitment and common goals
are more important. Thus, it is
crucial to find the right balance
between depth and outreach.
5. Demand for Services
MFAs are generally looked
at as service providers for the
Microfinance industry. Their
sen'ices range from networking
and informatiorr exchange to the
facilitation of trainings. Some of
these services can be sold at
market prices, others cannot.
Ideally, services would benefit the
whole sector. A zuccessful service
provider should know the market
for its products and its potential,
and offers services on the basis of
a realistic estimate of the dcmand.
It should further have.the capacity
to satisfy this demand.
MFAs should look at their
activities and find out which
services they can offer to their
mernbers and non-members and
analyse their needs, and the
capacity and willingness to PaY
for them.
Several extemal factors
contributed to this miraculous
success of microfinance
institutions during the crisis. First
of all, the unconventional nature
of clients helpat: Most micro
finance clients operate in the
domestic emnomy and were not




Second factor was the
efforts of the Indonesian
QbSatlQnwr(lounat- ilo{. 5 fu. 2 AuXvst mU
govemment to quickly institute
emergency antipoverty programs.
With help from the IMF and other
donors, govemment progams
supplied food, created
employment, and kept children in
school. These programs, along
with the stabilization measues,
ensured that most of the
economically active poor could
stay economically active and
therefore rvere able to make use
of commercial microfinance
services during the crisis.
Intenral Factors
However, more unique
success factors can be found in
the institutions:
First, borrowers greatly
valued the option to re-borrow in
times of difficulty and thus made
loan repalnnent a high priority.
Savers also tried to save more and
consume less. Thus, the behavior
of thc clients was the driving
force behind the stability, and this
behavior was the result of the
education that the institutions had
provided, directly and indirectly.
The institutions provided
trainings and education on the
basic economic concepts and
skills (direct), but the learning
also came from thc experience of
using microfinance institutions
(indirect).
Also, savers valued the
security, conveniencg liquidity,
confidentiality, products, and
services oflercd by these
institutions, and some siavets
moved their accounts from failing
banks to the unit desa or other
rnicrofi nance institutions.
Finally, the insfitutions had
built a record of trust. They had
good, corirmitted management,
friendly and motivated staff, and
products appropriate for
microfinance clients. As they had
successfully provided what clients
could not find or afford elsewhere
in a professional and friendly
way, clients rernaincd loyal
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projects such as the BRI Unit
Desa, BDB and BI(D. But there
still remain some outstanding
issues and challenges that
microfinance programs need to
address.
8. Inadequate outreach to the rural
community
Most of the programs that
havc bccn rclativcly successful
have been located in the Java and
Sumatra islands. Furthermore, the
bulk of the microfinance
institutions and programs in
Indonesia are located in the urban
area. The reasons for such limited
scope are as follows:
a. The successful program, BRI
Unit Desa, was initially
evolved fiom BIMAS
(Govemment Mass
Guidance) which was a
subsidized plogarn targeting
the rural rice farming
industryl the majority of the
rice farming industry in
lndonesia are located in Java
island
b. The majority of the
Indonesian population ls
actually located in these two
islands: 60olo in lava and 20Yo
in Sumatra. It made sense
that most of the programs
will be initiated in the most
populous regions.
c. ln order to remain
sustainablg the successful
program, such as the BRI
Unit Desa, needed to cover
its operations costs. One way
to achieve this is by making
. sure that there is a large base
of customers to spread its
expcnditures and makes sure
that it is located closer to thc
consumer's home and
workplace. Therefore, during
the restructuring of BIMAS
to BRI Unit Desa in 1984
many of these units relocated
from rural rice productions
centers to the urban
commercial centers or district
capitals
d. Government created new
laws to improve overall
banking regulation and
supervision due to a large
proliferation of privately
262
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owned banks in Indonesia.
The law's reach encompasses
BPRs operation. The effect is
increased minimum paid-up
capital requirements to set up
new BPRs and minimum
capital assets for existing
ones. This caused many
BPRs to move up from
villager'desa levels to
districUkecamatan levels
which reduce service for rural
areas (e.g. BKDs)
Greater efforts are still
needed to expand the reach of thc
microfinance progftrms. One way
to address this is to let BRI Unit
Desa to continue serving the
district levels and return the
BKDs to the village levels and the
more rural areas. Concerns such
as set up costs for rural areas
perhaps can be addressed by
seating a mobile microfinance
outlet. Some experimcnts have
been made to have a staff from a
more populated village area to
have a wcckly trips to the
surrounding more rural villages to
offer microfinance services, and
this had indicated some promise.
Government coordination will be
required to incentivize BKDs to
be more active in rural areas (e.g.
provide infrastmcture, initial
subsidies). Govemment also need
to revisit the 1992 laws and made
a distinction between larger BPRs
operating in a more economically
active urban areas and the smaller
ones in rural areas; adjust the Iaw
to prote€t microfi nance initiati ves
in the rural areas.
NGOs on the other hand can
play a role in pushing for a rvidcr
outreach of the microfinance
progam to rural area. NGOs can
provide initial efforts and grants
to start a program that specifically
target the rural poor and then push
the govemment to aid in
providing the right environment
to grow and sustain these
initiatives. Without government
support, it will still be difficult for
NGO programs to morph into a
more sustainable form of
microfinance because they have
limited resources for propsr
supervi sion and regulation.
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9. Impact of Politics
Microfinance Efforts
Most of the microfinance
progfttms in Indonesia are still
operated or funded bY the
govemment. Although BRI Unit
Desa is run by a commercial
bank, BRI itself is still owned bY
the govemment. The Positive
.. impact of this is that with the
support of the govemment, the
projects can receive initial
funding. InitiallY Private
commercial banks do not see the
profitability of microfinance and
thus steered away from it.
Successful govemment ld
programs had created interest in
the public sector to develoP such
services for the Poor, such as the
BDB (Bank Dagang Bali). But
there are negative imPacts also
that can threaten the future of
micnrfinance, whether it is the





Since most are Sovemment
owned or operated, there are
many political pressures that
can jeopardize the various
microfinance programs. One
example is that during the
election Periods, these
microfinance instirutions








werc ovcrstaffed and became
inefficient.
b. The govemment has manY
pmgrams rolled out from
different ministries, and due
to political and
communication issue, there
are conflicting Programs. One
example is the efforts from
the MinistrY of CooPeratives
to discontinue Plans too
expand the BKD system
which was quite successful'
The reason was that the
Ministry was worriexl that the
BKDs will comPcte with the
microfinance activities of its
own program called KUD
(Village Cooperative Units).
Yet since the cooPerative is
outside of the banking
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regulations, it has not always
adherc to prudent banking
standards in its operations,
therefore became lcss
sustainable than the BKDs.
Since the gov€rnment
resources is strained and many
times decision to pursue poverty
alleviation measures is
politicized, NGOs need to come
and put more pressure and
awareness to the plight of the
poorest of the poor. Better
communications between the
dilferent ministry departrnents
will also help to assure that one
project does not jeopardize the
others.
10. Lack of Awareness
Microfinance Policies
ol
Therc is still lack of
awareness of sound principles of
microfinance within the
organizations that developed and
provided microfi nance initiatives
in Indonesia, whether it is the
govemment officials, NGOs or
privately owned institutions
(formal or semi-formal). As of
yet, there is no centralized
training centers where the
different players in microfinance
can go and get additional training
and support.
This lack of understand ing
and training produced the
following problerns in order to
satisff public concerns or to
address. political pressures, the
governm€nt developed directed
and subsidized microfinancc
programs. The intention is rvell,
but some progmms were created
within the space of the sustainable
microfinance initiatives. This
created an unfair competition for
the sustainable microfinance
institutes such as the BRI Unit
Desa and can jeopardize its
operation
I l. Effects on Poorest of the Poor
Finally, there are @ncems
that the impact of microlinance in
lndonesia is only benefiting the
better-off of the poor. What about
the poorest of the poor? They are
people who are living below the
extrcme poverty line, PeoPle who
l,o)
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has no means of income, whether
it is skill or asset.
Microfinance works bY
allowing people who are alreadY
economically active to take
advantage of greater economic
opportunitics. It helps people with
microenterprise to borrow moneY
to purchase assets that can helP
improve its operations and profits.
It helps people with a working
income source to weather
financial shocks or shortages by
giving them a more flexible and'
smoothed finance, give loans or
provide means for savings to tie
them up till the next stream of
revenue comes along. It 
_helPs
people with the skills and
knowledge to create a business to
start one by providing loans to
acquire the necessary assets and
equipments.
What microfinance does not
do is to create new oPPortunities.
The poorest of the poor tYPicallY
have limited skills and assets to
create stable income source. Their
immediate and main concem is to
fulfilling basic needs such as
food, shelter and clothing. ManY
live in remote rural areas where
there is no viable market for thern
to become economicallY active.
For thern microfinance is not the




Indonesia has shown that with proper
incentives and good oPerating
principles that adherc to market
economy principles, Providing
financial services can not only
become sustainable, but even
profitable. The sustainable
microfinanee program, BRI Unit
Desa, was so well executed that it
ended up performing better than the
large commercial banks during the
1997 Asian economic crisis. This is
not just because the economic
activities of the BRI Unit Desa's
consumers is in domestic market. bul
also because the systern ha^s taught the
poor pople the advantages of having
proper credit history, due to the
progressive loan system, and good
266
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to weather them through
and slow lime.
As an institution, micmfinance
been successful in help improve
economically active poor to
and grow their source of
and increase their living
Unfortunately in ordcr to bc
there arc certain
conditions that need to be niet that
made expansion to rural and less
populatal area difficult. To address
this, government and NGOs need to
start by initializing subsidized
programs, then nurture and grow it
until it can become sustainab.le.
Innovations will also be needed to
assure that rural regions will be
served, such as mobile microfinance
outlet-
From studying Indonesian
microfinance initiatives, in such a
disperce and expansive counfty,
govemment involvement is crucial in
making sure that the prograrns can be
successful. Only the government has
enough power and resources to
provide the needed infrastructure,
supervision and regulation. Better
communications amongst the various
players and better understanding of
the microfinance principle will also
aid the govemment to regulate and
supervise the various programs.
Finally, care should be taken in
addressing the poorest of the poor.
Microfinance works well for the
economically activc poor that have
access to market. For others in the
lowest strata of economy, where there
is limited cr no economic opportunity
available, a program that includes aid,
training and infrastructure
development might be the better
choice. Microfinance is not a cure all:
its strength is in allowing the poor to
take advantage of economic
opportunities, not in.creating them.
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